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FOR RELEASE OCTOBER 10, 1962

8 :00 P.M. , E. S. T.
C!iP.N~'ENG

EUROPE AND UNITED STA'!'ES POLICIES

Address by Se!lB.t or Mike ¥-nnsfield (D. , Montana)

tl \ '\
I

The Springfiel d Adult EC.ucatiO!l Council
Springfield

~iblic

Forum, The Phillips Lecture

Technical High School, Springfield, Massacllusetts
Wednesday, October 10, 1962, 8:00 P.M.
t.JIII ha.11e.
Alth~~h

itAa.. tsken an inordinate length of time to
w'll

87~~ Co~ess

cor.q1lete it, the recordAshowf that the

of a substantial amount of p'\1.'-Jlic business .
be praiseC. or

bl~e~- -at

least uatil early

has disposed

For this work, it will
November--dependi~

in

no small pe.rt, I should ·i;hi::lk, on one ' s political preC:.ilections.
~e

of

Congress also failed to get through certain significant items
And for this, too , it will be praised or blamed, at

b~siness.

least t!ntil early November.
In the closing days of the 87th
~ajor ~easures

dilections,
t?~cG

to

were

clear~d .

~~e

notwithstand..~.J~,

Praise cr

Co~ress,

b~arue a~d

however, two

po!itical pre -

these measures are of irnnense impor-

nation.

I refer, first, to the foreign aid appropriation .

We cay

deplore this appropriation as a waate of money, a3 an invitation to
for.ei ~ il'Jgratit-o.1de or worse.
si~ted bu~nitarianism

or

We r:J.9.Y praise it as an act of far -

enli~tened

self-interest.

Em.·eyer "e may regard. it, there is no escapix.g the fact
t!~t

foreisn aid is a critical geer in the intricate machinery of

-::
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the nation's foreign relations .

It has continued to turn, more or

less adequately, for many years and through several administrations
of both political parties.

It is no overstatement to say that if

the Congress had removed the gear or crippled it by denying an ample
appropriation it would have risked bringing down the entire structure
on which the peace and security of the nation has rested for many
years.

Faced with that reality, more than a sufficient

n~er

of

Senators and Representatives were inclined to the course of prudence
with respect to this progr.am.

Members of both parties acted to

sustain the security and peace of the United States.
This is not to say that misgivings were absent on the part
of members who voted for foreign aid.
abo~t

Many entertained

one or more aspects of the aid-program.

frankness, thet I

personal~

~~y

seri~JS

doubts

I say, in all

share some of these doubts.

I do not believe, for example, that we can or should accept
as satisfactory for the indefinite future a course of foreign policy
which places great reliance on a continued outflow of dollar grants
to other nations .

Nor do I believe that we should accept by force

of habit a course of sustaining the independence of nations elsewhere by maintaining aid- dependent governments in a style to which
they may have become accustomed.

Nor do I believe that the long-

range interests of this nation are served by casting aid for the
economic development of emergent nations, a problem which has a
rationale of its own, in the framevork of a competitive struggle
between the United States and the Soviet Union.

- ·3 But the intelligent resolution of these and other doubts
does t:.ot lie i::1 the s :.ldden

smashi:.:~g

all t!lat that implies to the total
he~ce,

to our peace snd security.

of the gear of foreign aid wi t!l

machi~ery

of foreign policy and,

I believe, rather, that we must

look for the resolution of the doubts in a continuing alertness to
stt~tion.

the cl"l..anging realities of the ::.nternational

We nrllSt look

for it in constrl!ctive adjustments in the foreign policies by which
we seek to deal with these realities.

Al!d we must look for it,

fina:::..ly, in a continuous re - cx·dering of both objective and administration

i~

the aid-p:.:-ogr3Jjl i tsel:f, as circtllll.Ste.ilces 0J.sewhere and at

hQ:Ile change.

In these ways we r::Jay a"li.icipate, with some realism,

the dB:.f H!:en the depe!lde..1cy of others on the more c.ubious end costly
elements of the

aid-mech~ism

may came to an orderly end.

Indeed,

we 'LJE.Y look forward to the day when the dependency of our O''m policies
for peece and secl!ri ty on these same du!:>ious

elem~nts

may also come

to an orderly e!ld.
For this reaso!l, emong o'thers, it seems to me that the
P:reside:.~.t'

s !lew trade policy is the n:.ost important act of the recent

sessiou of the Congress .

This fi:::-st I!!B.,1or revision of foreig.'l trade

policy si:J.ce the enactment of the Recipro.!al Trade P:-ogram a quarter
of a cent"o.lry ago places in the hands of the

Presid~nt

authority to

d.es.l ef:tectiYely with r-ecent changes in the pa tkrns of in-rer!.la tic::1al
trade.

The program has g-reat significance for the continv.ed

gr~h

of ou.-r own domestic economy, for that growth is now i:1terwoven with
an expa!ldi::g oversea.::> trade.

But even greater,

per~ys,

are the

possfbili:..i es which are ope::1ed by the new t::ade program for placing

-~ our security and well-being on a more stable and equitable and,
hopefUlly, a less costly basis than that '..Vhich nmr prevails.
In this latter connection, the new trade law bears a
di~ect

relationsoip to the focus of tonight's discussion.

It has

particular relevance to Europe, to a changing Europe, and to our
relations with that region.
I he.ve e.li·eady referred to the need for a contin':ling
alertness to the evolving situation abroad.

!t is essential to

effective foreign policy that we do not imprison ourselves in a
sel:f-fashiou.ed cage of outworn facts and ri tualis~~ic sloga:1s.
Certa.i:U.y, lve ought not forget the experiences of the past .

But,

equally, we must be alert to tae realities of the present and try
Otu'"

best to antici!?a.te the needs of the fut'.'..re.
This alertness is most essential with

respe~t

to Europe.

For Europe has long been at the core of our foreign policies, and
Europe is che.uging rapidly.
are likely to require

It is chal:lging, moreover, in ways which

a~j·~tments

in policies on a scale more exten-

sive than a:n:y we have la..:.mm in the past decade.
We cannot yet define the
possible , or,

i~deed,

edj~ls tme:::1ts

which may be desirable,

inevitable in the years aeea&.

Our policies

interact with the policies of other nations and the courses which
they take will surely affect our own.

B'..lt lve will discern the lines

of adjustment, and we sha.il have a better chance to formulate effective adjustments as we deepen our understanding of what is presently
tr~nspiring

in

~~ope .

- sThose of you who have traveled from time to time on that
continent may have been struck by the obvious manifestations of change
over the years.

Indeed, a great change is readily evident in such

simple matters as the progressive improvement in the dress of the
people and the worsenil:Jg of the traffic problems in the major
European cities.

It is evident in the copious availability of food

and other consumer goods, in the general intensity of commercial and
industrial activity.
The present look of Western Europe, to one who saw it ten
or fifteen years ago, is that of a beaning prosperity.
the economic indicators sustain the apparent.
prosperous, and it is dynamic.

And, indeed,

Western Europe is

It is producing, investing, trading--

internally and externally--and consuming at unprecedented levels.
There is a general belief that this qynamism is due to the
Common Market.

The fact is that much of the economic momentum was

generated in the European countries on an essentially national but
cooperative basis, even before the Market arrangements began to go
into effect.

We may anticipate, therefore, that there is much more

to come if the Camnon Market continues to 11ve up to its initial
promise w::.d, if the cooperative concepts of the Market are extended
outward to other nations.
In a.ey event, the atmosphere of Western Europe in 1962 makes
it difficult to recall the Europe of 1945--the devastated Europe,
stunned by long years of privation, by the incredible brutality and
massive destructiveness of the war.

It is difficult, even, to recall

the Europe of 1950 or 1951--the Europe struggling to its feet with the
help of the Marshall Plan.

-~ Difficult though it may be, it is essential that we recall
these earlier Europes.

For it was in those settings that our basic

postwar comprehensions of the European situation were formed, comprehensions which persist to same extent even today although circumstances
have changed greatly.
We saw Western Europe, then, as hurt almost beyond help,
threatened by revolutianar,y upheaval from within and aggression tram
w1 thou.t.

We saw Western Europe dependent on this nation for its very

subsistence, let alone the revival or survival of its freedom.

And

after the Berlin blockade, we saw Europe, as a whole, split beyond
ar:ry expectation of healing between the monolithic oppressive Stalinist

system in the East and the reviving free nations of the West.

And

we saw, in a divided Germany the wedge of a deepening division in a

nation and a continent.
Throughout the early postwar years, our policies were reasonab~

attuned to the realities of the European situation.

They were

policies which could produce more and more vehement slogans of liberation, more and more speeches in the Congress on liberation, but,
unfortunately, not the act,;a.li ty of a liberation in Eastern Europe,
as we saw with striking cla!"it;y at the time of the Hungarian uprising.
But they were policies which, with less and less fanfare, were appropriate to the restoration of Western Germany, the recovery of Western
Europe and to the protection of its renewed vitality and freedom.
Western Europe readily accepted our leadership in those
years.

Cynics might note that the Europeans had little choice.

But

I prefer to think that our leadership was accepted i .n major part because
it was an understanding ,

effective and responsible leadership.

We

- 7 pursued policies which Western Europeans recognized as serving their
interests and policies which served our own interests, by safeguarding
the security, the peace, the

p~ogress -- the

essential well-being--of the

people of the United States, at a realistic and bearable cost.
As I have noted, attitudes tend to persist even after the
circumstances which give rise to them have changed.

National policies

s.nd administration are subject at least to the same inertia.

If we

wo··.U.d <leal effecti-vely with the Europe of 1962, therefore,

must now

we

gresp firmly the fact that we are no longer dealing with the Europe of

1945 or 1950.
~rith

In Western Europe, we are no longer dealing- - to be blunt--

the gaunt and shabby economic dependent, the shocked, tottering

and willing dependent of the earlier years.
~~ope,

On the contrary, Western

today, is on its feet and has been for several years.

More,

it is ru!l:Qing.
Indeed there are certain aspects of the change which has
taken place which border on the ironic .

European currencies, for

example, were once in little demand in the
n~rkets.

Same of these

dem.a.:J.d than our o-wn.

~~rencies

internatio~al

financial

ere now in relatively greater

Not so long ago we legislated. inducements to

encata"s.ge American enterprise to invest in \-!estern El;;,r ope a.nd fo-.md
very

few takers.

No'\oT

we are concerned a.nd. properly so by the great out-

flm>' of .American capital to that region, and.

we

are seeking to stimulate

lies tern European investment in this country as a partial counterbalance .
Ox:.ce we were badgered for leans by Western Europeans .

In recent years

we m·:e bee.:! seeking a. speedu-p in repayment of various obligations and
wba:'.;

is more .• the

Europe~s

have been repaying in advance.

Once we

- 8 placed
other

as far as possible, orders for arms ann

ab~oad,

~teriel

for NATO.

~u~itioos

and

Now, we are pressing the European allies to

make their mili ta.ry purchases in the United States as a means of obtaioi~g

foreign exchange to off-set the dollar-outflow involved in keeping

our mili ta.ry forces in Etll'ope.
I do not cite these examples in. dismay or alarm.

The recovery

~d

prosperity of Western Europe were the ends which we sought because

our

::JB.~.;ione.l

interests are ioterwoYen with these ends.

international

fi~cial

Mo:!"eover, the

position of the United States is one of great

reserves end in the past year this position has apparently strengthened.
I cite

t.~e

unusual end ironic t-..:.rnabouts, rather to indicate the extent

to which eeonOI:lic circumstances have che.nged in Wcster.a Ei.'.1 ope.
1'he transition has not been s'J.ddeo.
our policies --sooner or later--have geoera.lly

And as it has taken place,
adj\~sted

to the che.."'!.ges.

SO!lle of the examples which I have jus ·c cited are represents ti ve of
speci~ic
t~e

adj"tlStmeots .

But in more general terms, we might note that

policies of postwar relief. to a stricken Europe, the poetwar loans,

th3 M2.J.·shall Plan, have lung since passecl into histo:;:-y.

tion of Spain, no economic aid of any

ki~d

With the excep-

has beer· extended to Western

Etxrape for several years.
From one-sided economic aid,
a vastly expanded two-w-ay

i~

tra~--reg-.L..ar

short, we have progressed to
commercial trade .

This trade

has flourished, and it now encompasses one-third of our total trade,

$S. 3 bi:i..lion

in exports to Western Europe, and

from Western Europe in
which, in

$4.7 billion in imports

1961. Compare these figures with a pre-war trade

1938 stood at $1.2 billion in exports and $474 million in

- "9 imports.

Apart from its other virtues, the Marshall Plan was a key

factor in bringing about this immensely and mutually advantageous
growth in trade.
It is doubtful, however, that we can coast indefinitely in
this satisfactory situation even if we so desired.

It is not likely

that we shall be able to avoid difficulties in the period ahead in
our relations with Western Europe.

The basic question which is loom-

ing is whether a surge fonrard in Western cooperation, notably in
trade, is now possible, indeed, necessary.
The major decisions in this connection cannot long be avoided.
Indeed,

Weste~n

momentum.

Europe is moving towards them largely on a self-generated

The Inner Six countries--Germany, France, Italy, Belgium,

Netherlands and Luxembourg--are impelled by the high initial effectiveness of the Cammon Market into a speedup in the removal of economic
impediments as among

then~elves.

As a group, moreover, they are at a

point at which there will be a significant step forward in the freeing
of trade with nations outside the Market or tee heightening of restrictions on that trade.

Moreover., the very success of the Common Market

appears to be serving as a
European action on other

stimt~us

IDH . :..-~r.s ,

to integrated and quasi-independent

particularly on the part of the core

nations of Western Gernany e.:.::1 F·r ance.

And the resolution of the

Algerian question is likely to increase this stimulus.
Britain and other Western European nations linked in the Free
Trade Area commonly called the Outer Seven, are also carried toward
major decisions largely by the significance of the Common Market to
their trade.

They are drawn by both the great promise and the uncertain

-

1~-

prospects with which the Market confronts them.

And finally, we are

impelled towards major decisions not only by considerations of trade
but because of the
changi~g

r~y

position which all of Western Europe--and a

Europe--occupies in the structure of policy upon which our

peace and security depends.
We find ourselves, in short, in a period of major transition in Western Europe during which many questions, economic and more
than economic, are

appeari~g

and demanding answers.

know all the questions, let alone the answers.

We do not yet

For it does not rest

with us alone to pose the one or to compose the other .
It is in this context that the action of the Congress in
enacting into law the President's new trade program assumes great
importance to the nation.

In a most responsible and non-partisan

achievement and by overwhelming vote the Congress has equipped the
President to deal with the several possibilities which are emerging,
all of which have great significance for the nation's security, peace
and well-being.
It is easy enough to visualize these possibilities in an
optimistic light.

One might look ahead, for example, to the entry of

the United Kingdom and other European nations into the Common Market
or, in other ways, the devising of satisfactory trade arrangements
between the Inner Six and Outer Seven of Europe so that they will not
find themselves at sixes and sevens.
the

imme~e

One might look ahead, too, to

possibilities of trade-growth between this nation and all

of Western Ettrope, through the reciprocal removal of trade barriers,

- 11 -

in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Develop~ent ,

under the

Ge:1eral AGreement for Tariffs and Trade end in other ways.
Indeed these optimistic possibilities are now open.

But in

all realism we must recognize that they ar e not the only possibilities .
In this connaction, I would poi:1t to the difficulties which have arisen
ib the
It is

co~se

of British negotiation for membership in the Common Market.

~nders~dable

bot~ s~des

that there should be difficulties and cautions on

in these negotiations.

dismis sed by the glib

assertio~

~t

the heaitancies

tl1at it is

j~6t

sh~ild

not be

a matter of Britai:l

"wantU.g the caKe and eati:.:lg it too . " There is more inYolYed- -nrJ.ch more .
And much of what is involved is ccncerned with the Commonwealth .
We w·ill do well to re:lember that the COlOillonwea.lth, whatever its shortc om~

:.:gs, re:nai ns e. s ignificE.nt factor for restraint artJ. order and the

evolution of freedom in a world which is never far from chaos and filled
with tyTa.nny .
~e,~sed

E~ope

It is to be hoped, therefore, that arrangements will be

which permit reconciliation of new British ties with Western

with the maintenance of the Commonwealth .

For such a reconcilia-

tion may well decide whether present trends in Wester:l Europe will turn
inward or

outwa~d, t~Naras seclus~on

fr~entation

or toward

more~fective

or inclusio:l, in the direction of
cooperation amoLg all the free

Dations i!! meeting the worldwide problems of freedom.
If the coming tra!!sition in Western Europe will require adjust~ents

in our economic policies it is not unlikely that it will require

ad.Jus l:me'lts in political a:1d defense policies .

Again, it is possible

to view the possibilities in a most optimistic light.
for

exa~le ,

We

mi~~t

assume ,

that tile great economic progress of Western Europe might

- 12 produce a steady closing of political as well as economic ranks and the
development of more effective common approaches towards Easte:::-n Europe
and the SoViet Union, and towards all the issues involved in a common
advance of freedom throughout the world.

One might also assume the con-

tinuation and deepeni1J.g of military coope:m. tion under NATO, with the Europeans bearing an increased share of its costs in manpower and materiel,
commensurate with tr.e

improv~ment

in their economic situation.

Yet, we would not see the present situation fl'i.lzy if we did
not also note certain tendencies which suggest alterr.&ative possibilities.
We mt1st note, for example, tha.t Western policies with regard to China
and ether parts of the Far East are by no means parallel policies, let
alone common pclicies, and the gap vrhich has existed for years shows no
sign of closing.

That may be understandable inasmuch as the Far East

has become incree.s ingly remote fr<Y.ll the concern of Western Europe even
as it has cO!lle closer to ours.

Bui; near at hand, we cannot ignore the

fact that the profi tai:>J.e t:re.tie ar.!o.
since the breakdown in our

e.hi~.ping

relatio~ships

for some NATO members to resist.

enticements which have existed

with Cuba have proved too much

Again, I suppose one might rationalize

this situation by noting that many of the NATO members ar·e mari til::le
nations and, as such, have traditional reluctances or legal restraints
against introducing impediments to commerce on the seas, and further,
that Cuba is somewhat remote from their immediate interests .
But even more directly, in the North Atlantic relationship
itself, a relationship in which, presumably, the security and other
interests of the European members are at least equally and probably
more at stake, we cannot fail to notice certain anomalous tendencies.

- 13 There are obvious differences over nuclear strategy which far from
being resolved, appear to be deepening.

Further, it is years since

NATO established a force goal of thirty divisions in Western Europe.
At the present time, however, there are only twenty- three divisions
in the region,
s~re~gth
~d

~d

so far as I am aware, the only increments to its

in the past half- dscade have come from the United States

West Germeny which no•r supplies half of the European contingent.

This is the case despite the fact
Wester~
inc~ease

~hat

economic growth

thro~ghout

Europe would appear to equip the nations of that region to
their expenditures for the common defense and permit us to

reiuce o-..u-s •
In this instance, we are confronted with an
able

concl~sion

a~ost

inescap-

that tee Western European a:lies are either most

lackadaislcal about their security or they see the military threat
to the North Atlantic region or at least to Western El'.u-ope in a far
different perspective than do we .
This conclusion,
in the current situation.

~oreover,

is reinforced by another anomaly

I allude to it by pointing out that much of

the discnssion of foreign policy in the last Congress, as in its predecessors, revealed a continued deep ideological

hostili~3

and security

concern with respect to any and all relations with Es.s tern Europe.

The

Coi.lgressional concern included Yugoslavia and Poland despite the fact
the Presidents of bota parties
what different approa.ch at

thro~tout

1e ast t~o

the years have urged a some -

thsse two Eastern European nations.

With this exception and despite occasional short-lived efforts
to improve the tone of
during the

Gen~va

Un~ted

States -Soviet relations --as for example

Conference of 1955 ewi when the"Spiri t of Camp De;1id"

- 1~ -

prevailed- -our relations with Eastern Europe have, in fact, been extremely
limited, involving minimal diplomatic anc cultural contact and small- scale-·
i~

some instances - -trivial trade.

The closed-door situation in the East

Europeav Communist countries, of cou.rse, has
tion .

been a factor in this situa-

At the time the Marshall Plan was proposed, for example, the

Eastern

~~opean

governments under Stalin ' s

dicta~ion

almost COI!!Pletely from contact wi·tvh the West .

isolated themselves

But it is also true that

we imposed, as a n:B.tter of policy, our own quasi-qua!'a'-ltine on relations
with

t~at

region and have

retai~ed

it through the years.

The priuoipal

motives, appe.re:!ltly, have bceu a "bel ief that any other co-J.rse would
adversely

ef£e~t

the security of the West and the hope that

qt~si 

quarantine would cont!'ibnte to a libere.tion of the Eastern Eu::.·opean
people from oppressive Ccmm,mist govermnents.
In auy

eve~t, o·~.u- ~li~ies

vith respect to &.stern

have in,Tolved stringeut trad.e control::: for many yecrs.
heve

a~ted

EurOT?~

These controls

to keep O"ll!' conr.n':!rce "''i.t.h all of the &.stern Euraoean

comtriea at a very low level.

Exclusive of trade with Poland and

~.via, it has amounted to U!l<ler 0100 :nillio:J. a ..Jl.ear.

Aud the

great b·lllk of the $100 mi:lior. consist-s of t:-ade wi -t!\ the Soviet C"nion .
By cr.;ntrast,

O'XC

commerce with Yug£sk:r.la and Pola..ud, ·..:.::rtolding under a

somewllet cased. policy, came to over $300 :million in l96J..
It wo-uld reasonable to assume that a parallel policy towards
Easte-:::-n E.'.;.ro;pe would pre·.rail s:.nong our NATO allies .
~o

tha

s~ce

Communts~

of danger,

gover...:!ments.

shar~

the control of the

They are closer
conti~ent

with the

Their stake in the security of the West and the

liberatior.. of Es.stern Europe "\orould appear et least eaual to our own.

- 15 But we look in vain, if we look for parallel policies.

With the Soviet

Union alone, for example, the trade of the NATO nations of Europe
amounted to over $1. 5 billion in 1961.

And the trade of our NA'ro allies

with Eastern European countries, exclusive of the Soviet Union, in the
same year came to a t otal of over

$? billion.

Indeed, in the case of West Germany, trade with East Germany
has been about $500 _million a year for the past five years.

West German

trade with the Soviet Union alone amounted to $400 million in 19§1, equal
to our total trade with all of Eastern Europe, including Y•soslavia and
Poland.
Moreover,

t~e

trade figurPs are a bare-bones indicator of the

extent of increasing contact between West and East Europe.
a growing intr a-European tourism.

Add to it,

Add to it, the spread of conmercial

aviation networks unt il they embrace both parts of Europe and include
principal European ce.rri crs .

Add to it the direct rail service now

available between Mg_scow and Rome, Pe.ris and London.

Add to it new

credit agreemet:ts and sea-gobg shipping arra:1ge::nents which facilitate
the flow of trade between the two parts of Europe.
What begins to emerge from these and other indicators is a
far different portrait of t l:e all- European situation than that which
prevailed a decade or more ago, the period in which our general camprehensions were formed and our basic political and defensive policies
established.

The contemporary portrait hardly suggests a Western Europe

cowering with fear before the threat of imminent Soviet invasion, or
subversion fran Eastern Europe.

It hardly suggests a Britain, Germany,

France, or Ital.y which hold that the way to induce change in Eastern

- 115 Et:rope is to isolate it.

It hardly suggests Western Eurooe st..e.!ld.iEfi

firm or e-,..en st.ar.H)ing sti ll, insofar e.s contact with Eas ·tern Europe
is concerned.
On the contrary, the current si t 1 lation appears to be that
of a

~~one whi~h ~

it may be separated on ideologicalJines is

fiucljt>.g, thrO\:gh an extensive commerce and other ccn·eacts, a tolerable
way to li7e •ri th the division .
th~t. w:~ich

This is a fe.r d.ifferent Europe than

exisf-.ed at the time our 'O!"esent policies of g,uasi - quare.nt:!.ne

of Ea.sterro. .Eurooc were devised.

It is e. far dlf:f'erent Europe than that

which is suggested by the sitllati on in Berlin in whi.ch the trnited Ste..tes
and the Soviet Union confront each other in a

contin~o~s

state of

incip~

ent conflict .
It is a Europe, in short, which appears to ha-re changed
marke~ly

in a decaue, except

a~

Berlin.

So much has it

char~ed

that

it suggests the desirability of a critical examination of both our comprehensions of the situation and the yolicies which a r e derived from
them to

dete~ine

whether both may have fallen somewhat behind the times .

We will not serve our own interas-'.;s if '"e cloa.lt the realities of the
present situe.tion in the factaand slogans of the pest .

Policies per-

sisted i n long after circumstances alter risk irrelevancy or worse .
Certainly, we ought never to approach changes in foreign
policy lightly .

Neither ought we to fear them.

We nr..i.st always be

prepared to seek them if, in the light of altered situations, changes
may be i:1dica.ted in terms of our own security, peace and. well-being .

- lT In the end, it is the President who has the awesome responsi bility of decision in these matters.
Presi~ent

gains from

tho~~tfUl

But I have long believed that any

public consideration of foreign policy.

Nor is such consideration impossible in this country until after
November, as Mr. Khrushchev appears t o think.

T"r.e questions involved

in oar relations with the rest of the world are not political; they are
national .
to

The people of

t~is

nation have long since shown a capacity

the two and, in time, to deal with those in public life who

s~parate

fail to separate them.

It is with continued confidence in that cepaoity,

therefore, tfiat I suggest to

y~~

some aspects of the European situation

and our policies, which are in need of thorough and dispassionate public
exa'1lination.
1.

It docs net seem to me

ill..!!:te thst the impact cf tile

~ea.e.onalbe,

e~onomic

eXBJ!I2le, to anti -

f'o!C

transition in

\-l~si:€rY.l Europe

is

bo;:..nd. to be felt, not only in econor.1ic matters, but throughout the
structure of Western coopera.tion .
orce

pr~~onderent

It seems to me, further, that our

position of responsibility

St1a.rillg of responfiibili ty

i~ li~e

~ust

with the dlmin.ishing

bet-waen the basio:- capa.ci ti~s of tbe E-,'rCJi)eens
effa~t

of

Worl~

\'IN'

II on El'.u-ope recec'.es i!lto

failure of leadership in
essential of leadership.
cling to

~

evolve into a greater

adjustment~

an~

diff~:rences

on:>:·selves s.s the

t>.::. s~(>J:'Y.

this reality.

There is no
Rather , it is an

It would, indeed, be a failure if we were to

excessive responsibility in Western affairs on a mistaken

assumption that nothing has changed and the need for us is little dif ferent

th~

contiLue.
but

it ever was

that special sacrifices on our part must

In that presumptive course lies not only unnecessary tension

~ecessary

people.

a~d

cost and

tLt'\llc~efisSJ.-.r

risk for the

se~;a-i ty

of our own

- 18 More suitable to the present, it seems to me, is the course
of a less ritualistic

p~suit

and, at the same time, a more realistic

pursuit of interdependence among the Western nations on the basis of
a more proximate equality of benefit and sacrifice in our relations.
We may begin to find such a course through the new trade program and
a great expansion of trade, not only with the Common Market but with
all the Western European nations.

Certainly, that is precisely what

the policy is designed to permit, and I have no doubt that the President will pursue it with vigor.

But we need to be prepared for some

very bard and difficult bargaining in the days ahead.

We must be pre-

pared to look to our national needs with the same frank concern as do
others.

Unless we are so prepared we may well find ourselves continu-

ing to carry more of the burdens of intel'dependence while enjoying
l.ess of 1ts benefits • We will do well, too, to make certain that the
trade interests of La.tin America, Japan and other nations with whom
close and fortuitous relations are enjoyed, are not shunted aside in
the effort to strengthen the ties acrose the Atlantic.
2.

If the beginnings of the adjustments of our course are

to be found in the new trade program, they are not likely to end with

that program.

For, I do not think that we can discount for much longer

the existence of Western

Eurc~ean

concepts of security needs which

differ cons iderab1y from our own.

Nor can we i@ore the continued

reluctance of Western European governments to increase their sacrifices
for the common defense in the patterns which were determined some years
ago.

- :t9 }l.a.y I say the Europeans have an equal right to their views

as to what may present1y be necessary to_their defense, to the common
NA~~

defense, and every

co~sideration

shuuld be

give~

to their views.

But equally, we havP- a right and a responsibility to examine the extent
of our commitment to the common defense, particularly in view of the
to rea.ch the NATO

f~il·..u-e

of

pa~ents

vi_~- of

the

for~e

goals, in view of the consiste:1t balance

deficits which we have experienced for several years, in
exos..:Jd~d

European capacitY, to

commcn coste if they were so

incli~ed,

b~c.r

a larger sha::-e of the

and in view of tr.e enormous

burden of assistance which we have carried and are car.ryir-g, largely
alope, with respect to other areas of the world.
me that, at the least, the t!me is
military

a.~.O.-E_rograms

a~

past d.ue when the remaining

to \olestern E'..n'ope shOJ.!ld :?ollow the economic aid

progra:ns into history .
in

a~eaely

It would appear to

Nor is it unreasonable to consider

~tion
1\

expensive ground-fvrce commitment to Europe --both in manpower

a::J.d in dolla.rs - -if a reduction might be negotiated. for a reciprocal
withQ~awal

of Soviet forces from

Easte~

Europe.

Any such reduction

is, of course, inseparable fr0m a satisfactory and
of t"he Be-..·lin question.

en<lurin~_resolution

Othe:r.-Yr1se, ve ·..ro"'..ll.d be in the impossible situa-

tion of :reducing forceB in Europe or.=.e e.ay only to have to ir.crease them
the next .

3. Prospects for auy such course are also partially dependent
o:n. the situation in Fastern Enrope .
present

si~ation

And it is difficult to spea,k of the

in that region with any precision .

of ini'ormation are somewhat limited, to s&y the least .

Our public sources
Nevertheless

policies w.aich still derive from a:a interpretation of that region as
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the Soviet monolith which it was in Stalin 1 s day s eem to me to be open
to question.

Certainl.y, Eastern Europe remains an area of preponderant

Soviet influence .
in the Warsaw Pact.

Certainl.y, Communist nations of the region are linked
But it is hardly accurate to see the Soviet rela-

tionship with Finland and with Poland in the same perspective; nor is
it valid to equate the Soviet relationship with East Germany and with
Yugoslavia, nor

t~e

Rumania or Albania.

Soviet relationship with Poland and with Bulgaria,
Indeed, the latter country has actually severed

diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and sent its military mission
packing!
Whet

mean~~.

if agy, these and other differences in Eastern

Europe may have to t.'IJ.e ;peace and welfare of the United States is an
open question.

But nothing is gained by closing our eyes to the fact

that differences do exist or by regarding as sacrosanct policies which
derive from earlier ass1mptions with regard to the region from the Baltic
to the Black Sea.
On that basis alone, the policies whi ch we have pursued more

or less consistently with all of Eastern Europe except Finland and to
a lesser extent with Yugoslavia and Poland for a decade and a half clearly
r equire careful scrutiny.
with Eastern

~urope

has

Whe~

ris e~l

we consider, further, that NATO trade

to a level of $3.5 billion and other East-

West European relationships have greatly expanded, while we have continued
to maintain a quasi -quarantine, the need for thoughtful review becomes
even more evident.
I would reiterate that prospects for an orderly improvement
of our policies with respect to Europe or, at least, a safe reduction

- 2.1 -

in their burdens on the public, are likely to prove remote so long as
there is a continuance of the present

tensio~

in Berlin.

It is the policy and, by this time, it should be clear to
all that it is the policy of the United States neither to be provoked
into unnecessary war nor to surrender Allied rights in Berlin to force.
Whatever is necessary to assert that policy will be done.

But let there

be no mistake &s to the cost of that situation to this nation.

The

increase of several billions in the defense budget in the last two years
was closely rele.teC. to it.

~he

call-up of National Gua.xdFD:'Ieu and

Reserve conroo::Jpllts l e.s t year was directl.y related to it.

The grant of

standby authority to the President to do the same this year is related
to it.
I would poiut out, further, that the rights which we are seeking to safegua:d in Berlin are Allied rights even though the principal
responsibility
since 1948.

a~d

cost f or

u~:>holdillg

them has been borne by this nation

It eeems to me that, in the light of the altered situation

in Europe, we may prope!'l.y inquire wnether the Berlin situation today
is not at least as

w~ch

a responsibility of the Germans and the Europeans

as it is of the United S+,s.+-es.
in view of the

catastrophi~

We may proper1y inquire, whether or not

~.m,pli...•atio~s

which this situation contains,

it has not become, to some extellt, a '-Torldwide responsibility to share.
It would apeear to me that we have every right to insist that
those whose interests Rre at least as directly involved as ours bear
more equitably the risks

a~d

costs which are involved.

At the least,

it would appear to me that they join in an effort to find a rational
alternative to this dangerous aud costly situation, by such honorable

mear;.s as may be open, be it by diplomacy, be it through the United Nations
or through conferences on Germany at which the Ettropean nations who may
be prepared to contribute, as well as Germans, might be ;present.

Indeed,

it is not at nll inappropriate that both the United States and the Soviet
Union move

~~ther

back in such negotiations while the Europeans them-

selves make a greater

e~fort

to find answers to the problems posed at

Berlin by a divieed Germany.
In any event, I do not believe that we should be dissuaded
from seeking more rational a"lswe:rs to t.he Berlin dilemna. a:J.d related
questions by the raised eyebrows or the relatively cost-free reticences
of others, so

lo~g

as we continue to bear the preponderant burden of cost

and responsibility.
To stand firm while circumstances move on is not to stand
firm at all.
~otence

It is to

re~ede i~to

from which the

~nbv

irrelevance and a frustrating

escape may indeed be an ignominous retreat

or a war of mutuel a·"':Ihile;i.;iou.

~.no

Pres:tdent deserves to be sustained

at home and by allies abroad as he el!gages in an uuremi tting search for
a better Mswer to the dilE::Llla.

And the hour is indeed already very

late in Berlin.
I have discussed t:1zse matters with you, tonight, notwithstanding the fact that the

w.!.~ds

the political fires of November.

of October have already begun to kindle
I have felt free to do so because

these questions of a changing Europe and our foreign policies will be
with us all regardless of the outcome of the election.

- 2·3With the
decision.

Presid~t

remains the awesome responsibility of

He will have to make the decisions--decisions on which

hinge the security, the peace and the well-being of generations.
In all frankness, the decisions which are reached with regard to
foreign policy sre not likely to differ

si~ificantly

political composition of the next Congress.

whatever the

In these national

matters, I am confic!ent that President Kennedy will continue to
have the support of -the preponderance of the merubership of Congress,
as did his predecessor.

And I am confident, too, that he will have

the preponderant support of the people of the United States.

